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The generation of random numbers is a central challenge for a plethora of fields, ranging from scientific nu-
merical simulations, cryptography and randomized computations to safeguarding privacy and gambling. The
intrinsic random nature of quantum physics offers novel tools for this aim. Bell non-local correlations obtained
by measurements on entangled states allow for the generation of bit strings whose randomness is guaranteed in
a device-independent manner, i.e. without assumptions on the measurement and state-generation devices. Here,
we generate this strong form of certified randomness on a new platform: the so-called instrumental scenario,
which is central to the field of causal inference. First, we demonstrate that the techniques previously developed
for the Bell scenario can be adapted to the instrumental process. As the following step, we experimentally
realize a quantum instrumental process using entangled photons and active feed-forward of information, im-
plementing a device-independent certified-randomness generation protocol, producing 28273 certified random
bits, with a maximum extracted certified bits rate of 0.38 Hz. This work constitutes a proof-of-principle of
the quantum instrumental causal network as a practical resource for information processing tasks, offering a
valuable alternative to Bell-like scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
The generation of random numbers has applications in a
wide range of fields, from scientific research – e.g. to simu-
late physical systems – to military scopes – e.g. for effective
cryptographic protocols – and every-day concerns – like en-
suring privacy and gambling. From a classical point of view,
the concept of randomness is tightly bound to the incomplete
knowledge of a system; indeed, classical randomness has a
subjective and epistemological nature and is erased when the
system is completely known [1]. Hence, classical algorithms
can only generate pseudo-random numbers [2], whose unpre-
dictability relies on the complexity of the device generating
them. Besides, the certification of randomness is an elusive
task, since the available tests can only verify the absence of
specific patterns, which may go undetected but still be known
to an adversary [3].
On the other hand, randomness is intrinsic to quantum sys-
tems, which do not posses definite properties until these are
measured. In real experiments, however, this intrinsic quan-
tum randomness comes embedded with noise and lack of com-
plete control over the device, compromising the security of
quantum random-number generation. A solution to that is to
devise quantum protocols whose correctness can be certified
in a device-independent (DI) manner, i.e. solely from the ob-
served statistics and with no assumption whatsoever on the in-
ternal working of the experimental devices [4]. For instance,
only from the extent of the observed CHSH inequality viola-
tion [5], one can put a lower lower bound on the certified ran-
domness characterizing the measurement outputs of the two
parties performing the Bell test. After the seminal work [4],
several protocols of randomness amplification, i.e. to gener-
ate near-perfect randomness, from a source of weak random-
ness, and quantum key distribution, i.e. sharing a common se-
cret string through communication over public channels, have
been developed exploiting Bell inequalities [6–18]. In particu-
lar, loophole-free Bell tests based randomness generation pro-
tocol have been implemented [4, 16, 19] and more advanced
techniques have been developed to provide security against
general adversarial attacks in [17].
From a causal perspective, the non-classical behaviour re-
vealed by a Bell test lies in the incompatibility of quantum
predictions with our intuitive notion of cause and effect [20–
22]. Given that the causal structure underlying a Bell-like
scenario involves five variables (the measurement choices and
outcomes for each of the two observers and a fifth variable
representing their shared correlations), it is natural to wonder
whether a simpler causal structure could give rise to an anal-
ogous discrepancy between quantum and classical causal pre-
dictions [23]. Indeed, as reported for the first time in [24], the
simplest scenario, in terms of involved nodes’ number, achiev-
ing this result is the instrumental causal structure [25, 26]
(shown in Fig.1-a), where the two parties (A and B) are linked
by a classical channel of communication. This scenario has
fundamental importance in causal inference, since it allows
the estimation of causal influences even in the presence of un-
known latent factors [25].
In this letter, we provide a proof-of-principle that the in-
strumental scenario can be exploited to devise a DI random-
ness generation and certification protocol. Indeed, we show
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2FIG. 1. Randomness generation and certification protocol. a) Instrumental causal structure represented as a directed acyclic graph [22]
(DAG), where each node represents a variable and the arrows link variables between which there is causal influence. In this case, X, A and B
are observable, while Λ is a latent variable. b) The main plot shows the lower bounds fx(I) to H∞(A,B|E, x) as a function of I, for inputs
x = 1 (grey) and x = 2, 3 (dashed red). Interestingly, unlike what happens in CHSH scenario [4, 18], there is a difference in the bounds
corresponding to different inputs, indeed the certified randomness for x = 1 is slightly smaller than that for x = 2, 3. c) The randomness
generation and certification protocol is made up of three stages: (i) initial seed generation (defining Alice’s choice between the operators),
(ii) instrumental process implementation, (iii) classical randomness extractor. The initial seed is obtained from the random bits provided
by the NIST Randomness Beacon [37]. In the second stage, Alice’s and Bob’s outputs are collected and characterized by the min-entropy
corresponding to the value of the instrumental violation I∗, according to the relation shown in Fig.1-b. The value of the min-entropy indicates
the number of certified random bits that can be extracted. At the end, those strings are injected in a classical randomness extractor (Trevisan’s
extractor [27]) and the certified random bits are extracted. The extractor’s seed is as well provided by the NIST Randomness Beacon.
for the first time that the sequence of the measurement out-
puts obtained by the parties within an instrumental process is
characterized by a minimum amount of randomness, quanti-
fied by the min-entropy of the bit-string, which depends and
is certified by the observed instrumental violation. Therefore,
we demonstrate that the techniques previously developed for
the Bell scenario can be adapted to the instrumental process
venue, offering a valid alternative platform which involves a
causal structure requiring less number of inputs than the Bell
scenario. To implement the protocol in all of its parts, we have
setup a classical extractor following the theoretical design by
Trevisan [27]. This work opens the way to other applications
of the instrumental scenario in the field of device independent
protocols, which until now have relied primarily on Bell-like
tests.
RANDOMNESS CERTIFICATION VIA INSTRUMENTAL
INEQUALITY VIOLATIONS
Let us first briefly review the previous results obtained
within the Bell inequalities context [28]. In a CHSH (Clauser
Horne Shimony Holt) scenario [5], two parties, A and B, share
a bipartite system and, without communicating to each other,
perform local measurements on their subsystem. If A and B
choose between two given operators each, i.e. (A1, A2) and
(B1, B2) respectively, and then combine their data, the mean
value of the operator S = | 〈A1, B1〉−〈A1, B2〉+〈A2, B1〉+
〈A2, B2〉 | should be upper-bounded by 2, for any determinis-
tic model respecting a natural notion of locality. However, as
proved in [5], if A and B share an entangled state, they can get
a value exceeding such bound, whose explanation requires the
presence of non-classical correlations between the two parties.
Hence, Bell inequalities have been adopted in [4] to guarantee
the intrinsic random nature of the measurements’ outcomes,
within a DI randomness generation and certification protocol.
3In the instrumental scenario, which can be depicted with
the causal structure in Fig.1-a, two parties (Alice and Bob)
share a bipartite state. Alice can choose among m possible
d-outcome measurements (O1A, ..., O
m
A ), according to the in-
strument variable X , which can assume m different values,
while Bob’s choice among d observables (O1B , ..., O
d
B) de-
pends on Alice’s outcome. In other words, as opposed to the
spatial correlations in a Bell-like scenario, the instrumental
process constitutes a temporal scenario, with one-way com-
munication of Alice outcomes to select Bob’s measurement.
In analogy with Bell-like scenarios, the causal structure un-
derlying an instrumental process imposes some constraints on
the classical joint probabilities P (a, b|x) that are compatible
with it [25, 26] (the so-called instrumental inequalities) and,
as shown in [24], those inequalities can be violated when Al-
ice and Bob perform their measurements on entangled states.
In the particular case where the instrument X can assume
three different values (1,2,3), while a and b are dichotomic,
the following inequality holds [26]:
I = 〈A〉1 − 〈B〉1 + 2 〈B〉2 − 〈AB〉1 + 2 〈AB〉3 ≤ 3 (1)
where 〈AB〉x =
∑
a,b=0,1(−1)a+bP (a, b|x). Remarkably,
this inequality can be violated with the correlations produced
by quantum instrumental causal models [24]. The maximal
value attained by such quantum models is I = 1 + 2√2. Re-
cently the relationship with the Bell scenario has been studied
in [29].
In this context, we show that if a given statistics P (a, b|x)
violates inequality (1), then private random bits can be ex-
tracted from their measurement outcomes. More precisely, we
consider the general scenario where, in addition to Alice and
Bob, there exists a third observer – an adversary eavesdrop-
per Eve – who tries to guess Alice and Bob’s outcomes. That
is, Eve has some (classical) side information e, which may be
correlated with (a, b). For instance, the quantum state from
which Alice and Bob obtain a and b could actually be part of
a tripartite state shared with Eve and e could then be the out-
come of a measurement on her share of the state. For a given
input x, the correlations between (a, b) and e are given by
an extended joint distribution P (a, b, e|x) that marginalizes
to the observed statistics, i.e.
∑
e P (a, b, e|x) = P (a, b|x).
For each x, the randomness of (a, b) with respect to e can be
quantified by the conditional min-entropy H∞(A,B|E, x) =
− log2[
∑
e P (e) maxa,b P (a, b|e, x)] [30]. Interestingly, the
quantity inside the logarithm gives the optimal guessing prob-
ability by Eve, i.e., the probability that e = (a, b), for each x,
over all possible guessing strategies and average over her side
information e: Pguess(x) =
∑
e P (e) maxa,b P (a, b|e, x).
This is due to the fact that Eve‘s optimal guessing strategy
is known to consist of simply betting for the most likely out-
come given her side information e and x [31, 32]. Thus,
H∞(A,B|E, x) = − log2[Pguess(x)].
Now, the fact that P (a, b|x) violates Eq. (1) imposes
non-trivial constraints on its possible extensions P (a, b, e|x).
In particular, it restricts the values H∞(A,B|E, x) can
take. Indeed, it is possible to obtain a lower-bound
on H∞(A,B|E, x), for each x, as a function fx of I:
H∞(A,B|E, x) ≥ fx(I). For each x and I, the lower bound
fx(I) can be computed by applying to the instrumental case
the numerical techniques developed in [34] originally for the
Bell scenario (see Methods), via semidefinite programming
(SDP). The functions fx are convex and grow monotonically
with I; so that the higher the violation of Eq. (1) is, the higher
the min-entropy. Hence, the violation can certify both the ran-
domness of the outcomes as well as their privacy with respect
to any adversary. In Fig. 1-b, we plot fx(I) as a function of
I for all three values of x. Interestingly, the certified random-
ness for x = 1 is slightly smaller than that for x = 2, 3.
The entropy bounds obtained above require one to know
I. However, in actual implementations, the exact distribution
is unknown and one can only get a finite-sample estimate I∗
of I. To account for this, we adapt the finite-sample statis-
tical analysis developed in Ref. [4] for the Bell case to our
instrumental scenario. More precisely, we consider n exper-
imental runs, with inputs given by a string s = (x1, ...xn),
which produce a 2n-long output string r = (a1, b1...an, bn).
The estimate I∗ is defined as I in Eq. (1) but with the actual
expectation values substituted by finite-sample averages over
the n runs. The private randomness of the 2n-bit output string
r, given the input string s, is quantified by the min-entropy
H˜∞(R|E, s), defined analogously to H∞(A,B|E, x) but
with r and s instead (a, b) and x, respectively. A lower-bound
of the following form onH∞(R|E, s) as a function of I∗ can
be obtained adapting the strategy in [4] to the instrumental
case, which is done simply setting, on each run, y = a:
H∞(R|E, s) ≥ nf1(I∗ − γ), (2)
with probability at least 1− δ, where γ = √−2 log δ/n| 1q +
Iq| is the statistical error of the estimation, which depends on
the finite size of the sample (n), on the probability q of the
least probable input (x), on δ and on the maximum achievable
quantum violation Iq , which in our case amounts to 1 + 2
√
2.
Note that, for any fixed q and desired failure probability δ, γ
can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the sample size
n. The failure probability δ comes to play, in order not to
make the iid assumption on the adopted device (for further
details see Appendix A.2 of [4], whose calculations, origi-
nally made for Bell-like scenarios, hold also in the case of the
Instrumental scenario). This bound gives the minimum num-
ber of certified random bits that can be extracted from the ob-
tained 2n-bit raw output by a classical randomness-extraction
algorithm, in order to obtain a certified random bits string.
We feed our raw string to use our implementation of the ex-
tractor theoretically devised by Trevisan [27] (our code can
be found at [36]). The extraction protocol outputs at most
nf(I∗ − γ) certified random bits, according to a parameter
 set by the user as a preliminary, in our case 10−7 (for fur-
ther details about the randomness extractor, see the Methods
and Supplementary Information). Summarizing, the proposed
certified random number generation protocol consists of im-
plementing a quantum instrumental process, where the input
x is given at each experimental run by the NIST randomness
4FIG. 2. Experimental apparatus: A polarization-entangled pho-
ton pair is generated via spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC) process in a nonlinear crystal. Photon 1 is sent to the Alice’s
station, where one of three observables (O1A, O
2
A and O
3
A) is mea-
sured through a liquid crystal followed by a polarizing beam splitter
(PBS). Detector D0A acts as trigger for the application of a 1280 V
voltage on the Pockels cell, whenever the measurement output 0 is
registered. The photon 2 is delayed 600 ns before arriving to Bob’s
station by employing a single-mode fiber 125 m long. After leaving
the fiber the photon passes through the Pockels cell, followed by a
fixed HWP at 56.25◦ and a PBS. If the Pockels cell has been trig-
gered (in case of A measurement outcome is 0), its action combined
to the fixed HWP in Bob’s station allows us to project ontoO1B . Oth-
erwise (if A measurement outcome is 1), the Pockels cell acts as the
identity and we project onto O2B .
Beacon, then collecting the 2n output bits, evaluating the cor-
responding experimental value of I∗ and setting the desired
value of the security parameter δ, in our case to 0.01. At this
point, the minimum number of certified random bits that can
be extracted is n∗f(I∗ − γ), where γ depends on δ, n and q,
that, considering equiprobable inputs, is 1/3. Finally, these
bits are extracted with Trevisan‘s extraction protocol and con-
stitute the final output of our protocol.
EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PROTOCOL
The device-independent random numbers generator, in our
proposal, is made up of three main parts, which are seen as
black boxes to the user: the state generation and Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement stations. The causal correlations among
these three stages are those of an instrumental scenario (see
Fig. 1-a-c) and are implemented through the photonic plat-
form depicted in Fig.2.
Within this experimental apparatus, the qubits are encoded
in the photon’s polarization: horizontal (|H〉) and vertical
(|V 〉) polarizations represent, respectively, qubits |0〉 and |1〉,
eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σz . A spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC) process generates the two-photon
maximally entangled state |Ψ−〉 = |HV 〉−|V H〉√
2
. One photon
is sent to path 1, towards Alice’s station, where an observable
amongO1A,O
2
A andO
3
A is measured, applying the proper volt-
age to a liquid crystal (LCD). The voltage must be chosen ac-
cording to a random seed, made of a string of trits. This seed is
obtained from the NIST Randomness Beacon [37], which pro-
vides 512 random bits per minute. After Alice has performed
her measurement, whenever she gets output 1 (i.e. D0A reg-
isters an event), the detector’s signal is split to reach the co-
incidence counter and, at the same time, trigger the Pockels
cell on path 2. Bob’s station is made of a Half-Wave Plate
(HWP) followed by this fast electro-optical device. When no
voltage is applied to the Pockels cell, Bob’s operator is O1B
and, when it is turned on, there is a swift changes to O2B (the
cell’s time response is of the order of nanoseconds). In order
to have the time to register Alice’s output and select Bob’s op-
erator accordingly, the photon on path 2 is delayed, through a
125 meters long single-mode fiber.
The four detectors are synchronized in order to distinguish
the coincidence counts generated by the entangled photons’
pairs from the accidental counts. The measurement operators
achieving maximal violation of I = 1 + 2√2, when applied
to the state |ψ−〉, are the following: O1A = −(σz − σx)/
√
2,
O2A = −σx, O3A = σz and O1B = (σx − σz)/
√
2, O2B =
−(σx + σz)/
√
2. After having implemented the instrumen-
tal scenario, collected the raw bits characterized by a viola-
tion of the instrumental inequality and by its corresponding
min-entropy, we executed the classical randomness extractor
devised by Trevisan [27] and adopted also in [33]. Trevisan’s
extractor consists in a structure made of two algorithms: the
weak design and the one-bit extractor; taking as inputs a weak
randomness source, in our case the 2n raw bits long string,
and a seed, which is poly-logarithmic in the input size. The
weak design splits the extractor seed into smaller sets, charac-
terized by an overlap r, which, for our implementation [35],
cannot exceed 2e. The smaller r is, the longer will the final
extracted bit string and the required seed be. Then, the one-
bit extractor combines the weak randomness source with each
seed set and extracts a random bit, composing the final string
of random bits (for a detailed description of the classical ran-
domness extractor see Methods and Supplementary Informa-
tion). The complete procedure is summarized in Fig.3.
RESULTS
Our results are summarized in Table I and in Fig.4. The
reported violation values were obtained in different experi-
mental conditions, changing the alignment of the Pockels cell.
Since each violation value I in Tab. I was evaluated through
16390 raw bits, the statistical parameter γ appearing in Eq. 2
is 0.1619, considering a failure probability δ = 0.01. Hence,
the min-entropy bounds reported in Tab. I correspond to the
values I∗ − γ. Setting an error of  = 10−7 for the classi-
cal extractor, we were able to extract a total of 28273 certified
5II. Instrumental violation and 
certified min-entropy
III. Certified random bits 
extraction
I. Raw bits extraction
Implemented instrumental scenario
Obtained violation: I = 3.797 ± 0.051
Certified min entropy: 𝑯∞ = 0.4017 Extracted bits: 3193 bits
Certified min entropy
Trevisan’s
Extractor
Extractor’s seed
1
2
−0.5
0
𝐴1 𝐵1 𝐵2 𝐴𝐵3 𝐴𝐵1
Raw data: 16390 bits
Raw data
FIG. 3. Implementation of the Device-Independent randomness certification protocol: The implementation of our proposed protocol is
made up of three steps. First of all, an instrumental process is implemented on a photonic platform and Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are taken
as the bits forming the raw data string (in the image, the string of raw bits is represented through a square made of n pixels, where black
and white encode the two possible values). Secondly, through these collected bits, we evaluate the corresponding instrumental violation and
subtract the statistical error γ, that, in our case, amounts to 0.1619. Then, we evaluate the min-entropy corresponding to the obtained value
of instrumental violation minus γ, which characterizes our string of raw data. This is done through the curve given by the NPA method (see
Methods), corresponding to x=1, which is the worst-case scenario (lowest min-entropy bound), and multiplying it for the number of performed
experimental runs. In the third stage, we employ the Trevisan extractor, to extract the final certified random bit string. The extractor takes,
as input, the raw data (weak randomness source), a random seed (given by the NIST Randomness Beacon) and the min-entropy of the input
string. In the end, according to the min-entropy the error () threshold set by the user (in our case 10−7), the algorithm extractsm truly random
bits, with m < n.
random bits. The ratio between the extracted bits and the max-
imum amount of bits that could be in principle extracted after
n runs, given by n ×H∞ is shown in Fig. 4b. The length of
the seed, as mentioned, is poly-logarithmic in the input size
and it also depends on  and on the particular algorithm cho-
sen as weak design (see Supplementary Information, Figure
3). In our case, we chose the block weak design algorithm
[35], which, with respect to other algorithms, requires a longer
seed, but allows to extract more random bits. For more details
about the internal functioning of the classical randomness ex-
tractor and its specific parameter settings, see the Methods and
Supplementary Information.
DISCUSSION
In conclusion, in this work, we bring a proof-of-principle
demonstration that the instrumental process can generate and
certificate random bits in device independent fashion, consti-
tuting an alternative venue with respect to Bell-like scenarios.
Indeed, the obtained relation between the instrumental viola-
tion and min-entropy characterizing the output string requires
no assumptions on the quantum state being measured nor on
the internal functioning of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement de-
vices. It only requires that the implemented causal structure
is an instrumental process, i.e. in particular, that the instru-
ment is affecting Bob’s choice only through Alice’s outcome
(X has no direct causal influence over B). We do not require
the iid assumption either.
Through our protocol, summarized in Fig. 1-c and 3 and
implemented on a photonic platform, we were able to ex-
tract an overall number of 28273 certified random bits (sum-
ming up the values reported in the fifth column of Table I).
The highest conversion rate we were able to reach, from pub-
lic (input) to private (output) randomness (Nextr/(Ntrits ×
log2(3))) of ∼ 0.25, since 180290 trits were injected to the
apparatus. Considering that each experimental round lasted
1s, the maximum extraction rate, given by Nextr/(Nrun ×
6FIG. 4. Random bits extraction rate: In these plots we show the ratio of the extracted bits adopting the Trevisan classical randomness
extractor. Panel (a) corresponds to the extractor over raw bits collected from the experimental apparatus; whereas panel (b) over the maximum
amount of bits that could be extracted according to their certified min-entropy. The exact number of extracted bits for each obtained value of
the instrumental violation is included in Tab. I
.
∆trun), was of 0.328 Hz, we considered an upper bound for
∆trun of 1s. Note that the bottleneck of our implementation,
which prevents us to reach higher rates, is the time response of
the liquid crystal, that implements Alice’s operator and makes
∆t ∼ 700ms. Hence, these rates could be higher if Alice’s
measurement station was implemented with an electro-optical
fast device, with shorter response times. We also notice that,
as seen in Fig. 1-b, the randomness generated is different for
each input x. This suggests that, in principle, more random-
ness could be obtained if the best input was chosen more of-
ten [38]. Let us note that our experimental implementation
requires the fair sampling assumption, due to our overall low
detection efficiency. Moreover, in the present paper, we adapt
the techniques developed by Pironio et al. [4], which is se-
cure against a classical malicious adversary. The same secu-
rity assumption is made also in [16, 32]. Only very recently
the ultimate solution for unconditional security, included fi-
nite statistics and non-iid, was given for the Bell scenario [17].
We expect that the same techniques are applicable to the in-
strumental scenario.
This proof-of-principle opens the path for further investiga-
tions of the instrumental scenario as a possible venue for other
information processing tasks usually associated to Bell sce-
narios, such as self-testing [39–48] and communication com-
plexity problems [49–51].
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METHODS
Experimental details
Photon pairs were generated in a parametric down conver-
sion source, composed by a nonlinear crystal beta barium bo-
rate (BBO) of 2 mm-thick injected by a pulsed pump field with
λ = 392.5 nm. After spectral filtering and walk-off compen-
sation, photons of λ = 785 nm are sent to the two measure-
ment stations A and B. The crystal used to implement active
feed-forward is a LiNbO3 high-voltage micro Pockels Cell –
7Instrumental violation (I∗) Standard Deviation H∞ Extracted Bits Extractor’s seed length Extraction rate (Hz)
3.1587 0.0528 0 0 0 0
3.2117 0.0528 0.0185 52 32768 0.0065
3.2144 0.0528 0.0196 61 32768 0.0075
3.3372 0.0525 0.0710 483 131072 0.0590
3.4025 0.0513 0.1023 739 163840 0.0902
3.4337 0.0519 0.1184 870 180224 0.1063
3.4578 0.0512 0.1313 977 196608 0.1193
3.4618 0.0517 0.1335 995 196608 0.1215
3.4774 0.0515 0.1423 1066 196608 0.1302
3.4935 0.0523 0.1515 1142 196608 0.1395
3.5072 0.0513 0.1596 1209 212992 0.1475
3.5193 0.051 0.1669 1269 212992 0.1549
3.5438 0.0514 0.1822 1394 212992 0.1702
3.5603 0.0512 0.1930 1482 229376 0.1809
3.5736 0.0504 0.2018 1555 229376 0.1898
3.6031 0.0509 0.2224 1723 229376 0.2103
3.6087 0.0516 0.2265 1756 245760 0.2144
3.6289 0.0507 0.2415 1880 245760 0.2294
3.6646 0.0508 0.2698 2111 245760 0.2577
3.6658 0.0497 0.2708 2119 262144 0.2587
3.6771 0.0510 0.2803 2197 262144 0.2682
3.7970 0.0505 0.4017 3193 294912 0.3897
TABLE I. Extracted certified random bits. In this table, we show the obtained results, given by our randomness generator and certifier.
Starting from the left, the first and second columns contain all the obtained instrumental violations each of them through 16390 experimental
runs, with their standard deviations, estimated through Poissonian error on the coincidence counts propagated. The third column shows the
min-entropy in the worst-case (i.e. x=1), through the NPA method (see Methods), corresponding to each violation (I∗) minus the statistical
parameter γ of Eq.2, which, for a failure probability δ = 0.01, amounts to 0.1619. The fourth column shows the number of raw bits, while
in the fifth and sixth, there is the number of bits extracted, through the Block-weak design algorithm (see the Methods and Supplementary
Information) within the classical randomness extractor, setting an error of  = 10−7, which required the seed lengths shown in the fifth column.
In the sixth column, we are showing the extraction rate, i.e. the number of extracted bits per second, considering that each measurement run
lasted at most 1s.
made by Shangai Institute of Ceramics with < 1 ns risetime
and a fast electronic circuit transforming each Si-avalanche
photodetection signal into a calibrated fast pulse in the kV
range needed to activate the Pockels Cell– is fully described
in [52]. To achieve the active feed-forward of information, the
photon sent to Bob’s station needs to be delayed, thus allow-
ing the measurement on the first qubit to be performed. The
amount of delay was evaluated considering the velocity of the
signal transmission through a single mode fiber and the acti-
vation time of the Pockels cell. We have used a fiber 125 m
long, coupled at the end into a single mode fiber that allows a
delay of 600 ns of the second photon with respect to the first.
NPA method applied to the instrumental scenario
In order to estimate the randomness in the instrumental sce-
nario we adapted the numerical method proposed in [4], which
is valid for the Bell scenario. The idea is to consider that
additionally to Alice and Bob, there exists a third observer,
Eve, that is trying to guess Alice and Bob’s outcomes. The
three observers share a tripartite state |ΨABE〉, onto which
they perform local measurements. The statistics obtained are
then evaluated on an instrumental inequality, which allows us
to calculate Eve’s maximum guessing probability. Eve is as-
sumed to know |ΨABE〉 and the measurements implemented
by Alice and Bob. In this case, the maximum probability that
Eve guesses correctly (a, b) given that x = j (j = 1, 2, 3),
and the value I = β for the left-hand side of (1) was obtained
is
max
∑
a,b
〈ΨABE |Pia|x=j ⊗Πb|y=a ⊗Πe=(a,b)|ΨABE〉
s.t. P (a, b|x) = 〈ΨABE |Πa|x ⊗Πb|y=a ⊗ IE |ΨABE〉,
∀a, b, x I({P (a, b|x)}) = β,
where the maximization is taken over all possible tripartite
states ΨABE and local measurements {Πa|x}, {Πb|y}, {Πe}
to Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively.
This optimization problem is computationally intractable,
as it considers quantum systems of arbitrary dimension. A
way out is to upper-bound its value by using the Navascue´-
8Pironio-Acı´n (NPA) hierarchy [34]. In the standard Bell sce-
nario, the NPA hierarchy is used to generate a sequence of
sets Q1 ⊃ Q2 ⊃ . . . that converges to the set of quantum
behaviours. Here, we adapt it to the instrumental scenario,
by addressing Bell behaviours {P (a, b|x, y)}a,b,x,y lying on
some levelQk of the hierarchy and imposing extra restrictions
solely on the events for which Bob’s input matches Alice’s
output, i.e. on the sub-behaviour {P (a, b|x, y = a)}a,b,x.
NPA then ensures that our optimization runs over a supraset
of the set of quantum behaviours actually originated in an in-
strumental experiment, while leaving the events P (a, b|x, y)
where y 6= a as free variables that are not considered in the
experiment.
More explicitly, we wish to characterize Alice and Bob’s in-
strumental behaviours that can be obtained as marginals of a
tripartite behaviour involving Eve. Hence, our upper-bound
approximation to the probability Pguess(x = j) that Eve
guesses correctly (a, b), given that x = j (j = 1, 2, 3) and
that the probabilities {P (a, b, e|x)}a,b,e,x display a violation
I({∑e P (a, b, e|x)}a,b,x) = β, is given by
max
P (a,b,e|x,y)
∑
a,b
P (e = (a, b)|x = j, y = a) (3)
s.t. {P (a, b|x, y, e = e0)} ∈ Qk, ∀e0
I({
∑
e
P (a, b, e|x, y = a)}) = β.
In our implementation, we used k = 2.
The optimal value Pguess(x = j) of the above SDP is used
to define fx=j(I) = −log2(Pguess(x = j)) in the lower
bound H∞(A,B|E, x = j) ≥ fx=j(I) mentioned in the
main text.
Classical Randomness Extractor
Given a string of n bits, characterized by min-entropy
k, with k = αn, where α is the min-entropy per bit, a
quantum-proof (k, )− extractor is a deterministic function
which, taking the string as input (the so-called (weak) ran-
dom source), along with a uniformly distributed seed made of
d bits, outputs a m-bit long string -close to uniform. The
strength of a randomness extractor depends on two quanti-
ties: (i) the so-called entropy loss, given by k − m, and (ii)
the bit-length d of the seed. Both these parameters should be
optimized, since the goal is to minimize the losses while con-
suming the smallest possible amount of randomness.
Recently, a promising randomness extractor, Trevisan’s ex-
tractor [27], has attracted considerable theoretical interest
since it has been proven to be secure against quantum adver-
saries [53]. The seed length of Trevisan’s extractor is poly-
logarithmic in the size of the input, greatly outperforming
randomness extractors based on (almost) universal hashing,
which are the most often used in quantum cryptography but
require a seed whose size scales linearly with the length of the
input. Trevisan’s extractor has been also proven to be a strong
extractor [54], i.e., the seed is almost independent of the final
output, so the randomness of the seed is not consumed by the
process and can be reused as part of the result.
Implementations of this extractor were made by Ma et al.
[55], Mauerer et al. [35], and more recently by Shen et al.
[18]. The extraction protocol is composed by two parts: (i) the
weak design, that divides the initial seed into smaller blocks
of random bits of length t and (ii) the one bit extractor, which
extracts a single random bit from the random source for each
block. In the weak design, the blocks {S1, ..., Sj} into which
the seed is divided should be nearly independent to ensure that
the maximum amount of entropy is extracted. Hence, a family
of sets S1, . . . Smsubset[d] is a weak (m, t, r, d)-design if
1. For all i, |Si| = t 2. For all i,
∑i−1
j=1 2
|Sj∩Sj | ≤ rm,
where the parameter r is the so-called overlap of the weak
design. Each of the Sj is fed into a one bit extractor and
they are all finally concatenated into a string to form the ex-
tracted randomness. In our work, we adopted two types of
weak design. The first, which we will refer to as the stan-
dard weak design, is a refined version of Nisan and Wigder-
son [56], whose effectiveness was proved by Hartman and
Raz [57], under the parameters choice given by r = 2e and
d = t2 with t = 2dlog n + 2 log 2/e. The second, called
block weak design, is a design from Ma and Ta [58] modified
by Mauer et al. [35] with r = 1 and d = (l + 1)t2, where
l := max{1, d log(m−r′)−log(t−r′)log(r′)−log(r′−1) e} and r′ = 2e. In com-
parison, the second design requires a seed’s length exceeding
the input weak random source’s string’s length, but it allows
to extract more bits from the source, due to a smaller r. The
one-bit extractor is realized by an error correcting code, which
is constructed by concatenating a Reed-Solomon code with
an Hadamard code. Hence, as a preliminary step, we fix the
following three parameters: (i) n (input length), (ii) α (min-
entropy per bit, certified by the experimental instrumental vi-
olation, see Fig.1-c and Fig.3) and (iii)  (error per bit). After
that, we derive the seed length, the total min-entropy k = αn,
andm = (k−4 log 1 −6)/r. As we can see, fixing the lenght
m of the output string and the error per bit , the min-entropy
required increases with the overlap of the sets {Si}.
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Randomness Extractor
Quantum correlations can be exploited to generate random numbers, whose randomness can be device-independently certi-
fied. However, in real experimental conditions, quantum correlations are inevitably mixed with classical noise, which could
be controlled and used by an adversary (Eve) to gain partial information about the output random bits. This is the reason why
there is the need to apply a post-processing procedure to filter the true randomness out of the raw bits generated by a Quantum
Random Numbers Generator (QRNG). This procedure is called randomness extraction and it involves the use of classical al-
gorithms known as randomness extractors [1, 2]. The aim of these algorithms is to obtain a bit sequence, following an almost
uniform distribution, up to an error parameter , which can be made arbitrarily small. The inputs of a randomness extractors are
the following: a weak random source, constituted by the raw bits and characterized by a min-entropy of at least k and a seed of
length d, not necessarily uniform [3]. The accuracy of the extractor can be increased, for a given min-entropy k, by reducing the
number of extracted bits and by injecting a longer seed.
A deterministic function which takes as inputs the source and the seed and achieve these goals is called (k, ) − extractor.
The optimum situation, therefore, would be to have m, the number of extracted bits, as close to k as possible, meaning that all
the available min-entropy has been extracted (indeed k −m is the entropy loss), and the seed, of length d, as small as possible,
to minimize the amount of additional randomness.
Recently, an important and promising randomness extractor, Trevisan’s extractor [4], has aroused considerable theoretical
interest, since it has been proven to be secure against quantum adversaries [5]. This algorithm requires a seed that scales
polylogarithmically in the input size, giving an advantage over extractors adopting (almost) universal hashing, whose seed
grows polinomially with the length of the input. Furthermore, Trevisan extractor is also proven to be a strong extractor [6], i.e.
the seed can be concatenated to the extracted string and used as a part of the result, being nearly independent from the output
string. Two implementations of this extractor were made by Ma et al. [7] and Mauerer et al. [8].
Trevisan’s construction, in a few words, is a recipe to build a randomness extractor combining two elements: a one bit extractor
and a weak design algorithms. In our case, we used the construction of Mauerer et al. [8].
The weak design splits the given seed into sub-seeds, characterized by an overlap. The adopted weak design is a refined
version of the original one from Nisan and Wigderson [9]. Since a larger overlap produces a larger entropy loss, we adopted
an algorithm originally devised by [10] and then refined by [8], to construct a new design known as block weak design, which
significantly reduces the overlap. Each packet produced by the weak design is then fed into a one-bit extractor, which extracts
a single random bit from the random source. These bits are finally concatenated into a string to form the extracted random
bits. The one-bit extractor was implemented as an error correcting code, realized concatenating a Reed-Solomon code with an
Hadamard code.
Using this construction the number of extracted bits is given by m = b(k − 4 log2(1/) − 6)c. In Fig.1-8, we show the
behaviour of our extractor’s parameters.
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FIG. 1: Length of the single set S of the weak design depending on the error per bit. It can be noted that in semi-log scale, the sub-seed
length t is a step function and decreases linearly as the error per bit  increases. Furthermore, the greater the input n, the greater the length of
the single sub-seed created by the weak design.
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FIG. 2: Length of the single set S of the weak design vs the input length of the source. In this figure is represented how the sub-seed length
t varies as a function of the input length n, plotted for different error per bit  parameters. We can see that in semi-log scale the sub-seed length
is a step function and increases linearly with the input. Furthermore, the greater the error per bit, the smaller the length of the single sub-seed
created by the weak design.
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FIG. 3: Ratio between the output length of the extractor and the error per bit parameter. This figure shows linear dependence in semi-log
scale of the output length m (multiplied by a constant factor r) as a function of the error per bit . Output length increases with the error and
the greater the min-entropy k, the greater the output length.
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FIG. 4: Output length vs the min-entropy of the source. It can be noted that the output length m (multiplied by a constant factor r) is a
linear growing monotone function of the min-entropy of the source k and it also increases with the error per bit .
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FIG. 5: Dependency of seed length from the error per bit. Here different graphs of the seed length d as a function of the error per bit  are
plotted, for different input source length in semi-log scale. These functions are step functions and, with the same error, the seed increases with
the size of the input n.
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FIG. 6: Comparison between seed length and the input length of the source. In this figure is represented the seed length d vs the input
length n in semi-log scale, plotted for different error per bit  parameters. The seed is a step function of the input length, it increases with n
and, with the same input length, the seed length is greater for lower errors.
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FIG. 7: Relation between the seed length of block weak design and the input length of the source. The seed length d as a function of the
input length n is plotted for different values of min-entropy per bit α and the error per bit  parameter is fixed at  = 10−7. d is a monotone
increasing function of n and it increases also with α. Both the axes are in logarithmic scale.
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FIG. 8: Seed length of block weak design depending on the error per bit. For different input length of the source, the seed length d as
function of the error per bit  is plotted. d is a descending step function of , but it increases with n. The min-entropy is fixed at α = 0.4 and
both the axes are in logarithmic scale.
6[1] N. Nisan and A. Ta-Shma. Extracting randomness: A survey and new constructions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
58:148−173, 1999.
[2] R. Shaltiel, An Introduction to Randomness Extractors, Automata, Languages and Programming, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Vol. 6756 (Springer, Berlin, 2011), p. 21.
[3] Anindya De, Christopher Portmann, Thomas Vidick, and Renato Renner, "Trevisan’s extractor in the presence of quantum side informa-
tion," SIAM Journal on Computing 41, 915−940 (2012), arXiv:0912.551
[4] L. Trevisan, J. ACM 48, 2001 (1999).
[5] A. De, C. Portmann, T. Vidick, and R. Renner, SIAM J. Comput. 41, 915 (2012)
[6] R. Raz, O. Reingold, and S. Vadhan, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 65, 97 (2002).
[7] X. Ma, F. Xu, H. Xu, X. Tan, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, Postprocessing for Quantum Random-Number Generators: Entropy Evaluation and
Randomness Extraction, Phys. Rev. A 87, 062327 (2013)
[8] W. Mauerer, C. Portmann, and V. B. Scholz, "A modular framework for randomness extraction based on Trevisan’s construction,"
arXiv:1212.0520v1
[9] Noam Nisan and Avi Wigderson, "Hardness vs randomness," Journal of Computer and System Sciences 49, 149−167 (1994).
[10] Xiongfeng Ma and Xiaoqing Tan, An explicit combinatorial design, Tech. Rep. (2011) eprint, http://arxiv.org/abs/arXiv:1109.6147
arXiv:1109.61
